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The Bankruptcy Trustee's
Arsenal Against the Enforcement
of Stock Redemptions
by Howard A. Rubenstein, Esquire*

Attorneys are frequently asked to
address the problem of developing the
most appropriate means for a stockholder
to divest himself of holdings in a closely
held corporation. Usually this problem is
solved through the drafting and execution
of a stock redemption agreement. These
agreements, however, may not always
withstand the test of time.
The typical stock redemption problem
arises when a corporation has few stockholders and one or more of them become
disenchanted with the operation of the
business. Seeking to have his stockholdings
acquired by the corporation, the disenchanted stockholder begins by reviewing
the financials of the corporation to determine the existence and extent of the shareholder's equity and, thereby, to determine
a fair value for his shares. The next step is
to analyze the corporation's cash position.
As often occurs, even though there may be
sufficient capital surplus to justify the
redemption of stock, the cash flow may be
insufficient to permit the corporation to
consummate the redemption entirely on a
cash basis. Rather, a portion of the
*Mr. Rubenstein would like to extend special thanks to Linda Thomas, a secondyear law student at the University of
Baltimore School of Law, and currently a
law clerk with the law firm of Adelberg,
Rudow, Dorf, Hendler & Sameth, for her
contribution to this article.

redemption value is paid in cash at the
time of the surrender of the stock certificates and the remainder is accounted for
through the execution of a note. The note
is payable over a stated period of time and
may be secured by assets of the corporation.
The thrust of this article is to point out
the consequences that may be encountered
by the holder of this note when the corporation's business takes a downturn such
that the corporation ceases to have a capital surplus and becomes insolvent. Thereafter, the corporation's assets are subject to
the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy or equity
court and will be administered by a bankruptcy trustee or a state court, an assignee
for the benefit of creditors and receiver. A
bankruptcy trustee must determine the
validity of the stock redemption transaction and whether any recovery can be
made from the former shareholder. A key
element of this determination turns upon
when the stock redemption is considered
to have occurred.
Section 2-301 of the Maryland Corporations and Associations Article l defines a
distribution as "a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property...or an
incurrence ... of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of the corporation's stockholders in respect of any of its
shares."2 Such a distribution may be in the
form of "[a] purchase, redemption...or
other acquisition of shares; or [as] [a]n

ISSUance of evidence of indebtedness."3
Section 2-311 states that "[i]f the
indebtedness is issued as a distribution,
each payment of principal or interest on
the indebtedness is treated as a distribution, the effect of which is measured on the
date the payment is actually made."· In
interpreting the language of these two sections, the bankruptcy trustee may conclude that each payment of the stock
redemption note should be looked at as a
separate and distinct transaction, the validity of which must be determined.
The bankruptcy trustee has five different
weapons in his arsenal through which he
can render the redemption transactions
invalid and thereby recover assets for the
bankruptcy estate from the former shareholder. These "weapons" include: (a)
Maryland statutes restricting acquisition of
stock; (b) the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act; (c) the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act under section 548
of the Bankruptcy Code; (d) preferences
under section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code; and (e) subordination under section
510 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the
commencement of the case, and
without regard to any knowledge of
the trustee or of any creditor, the
rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of the property of the debtor,
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or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by(1) a creditor that extends credit
to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and
that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial
lien on all property on which a
creditor on a simple contract could
have obtained such a judicial lien,
whether or not such a creditor
exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit
to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and
obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, an execution
against the debtor that is returned
unsatisfied at such time, whether
or not such a creditor exists;
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real
property from the debtor, against
whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected, that
obtains the status of a bona fide
purchaser at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or
not such a purchaser exists.
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable
law by a creditor holding an unsecured
claim that is allowable under section
502 of this title or that is not allowable
only under section 502(e) of this title. 5
Section 544 has historically been known as
the "strong arm chiuse." This section confers upon the trustee the status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, which
thereby enables him to avoid certain transactions. This hypothetical creditor has the
rights and powers of a creditor of the debtor who upon a simple contract could have
obtained a judicial lien on the debtor's
property, or of a creditor who has obtained an execution against the debtor which is
returned unsatisfied, or of a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor,
other than fixtures, which property passes
to the bankruptcy trustee. 6 In essence, section 544(a) states that
"[w]herever under the applicable law
such a creditor. .. might prevail over
prior transfers, liens, encumbrances or
the like, the trustee will also prevail.
[Similarly,] section 544(b) permits the
trustee to exercise whatever rights of
avoidance any creditor holding an
unsecured allowable claim could have
exercised on his own behalf under
applicable state or federallaw."7
I. STATE lAW
The bankruptcy trustee has had an entire

body of state law conferred upon him by
reference by virtue of section 544. It has
been stated that "[w]hether the trustee is
entitled to such a status and the conditions
under which he may attain it, are federal
questions governed by the Bankruptcy
Code."B "But the extent of the trustee's
rights, remedies and powers as a lien creditor are measured by the substantive law of
the jurisdiction governing the property in
question."9
In Maryland, the power to invalidate
stock redemption transactions can be
found in: (a) sections 2-301 through 2-312
of the Corporations and Associations Article of the Maryland Code regarding restrictions on corporate acquisition of stock;
and (b) sections 15-201 through 15-214 of
the Commercial Law Article of the
Maryland CodelO regarding the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
A. Restrictions on Stock Acquisitions
As noted previously, section 2-301 of the
Corporations and Associations Article
defines a corporate distribution as including a purchase, redemption, or other
means of acquisition of the corporation's
shares. II Therefore, each payment by the
corporation on the note for the redemption of shares from the former shareholder
falls into the category of a corporate distribution. The corporate charter may provide for the acqUlSltlOn of the
corporation's own shares, but the acquisition must be in compliance with section 2311 of the Corporations and Associations
Article. Section 2-311 states that
[n]o distribution may be made if, after
giving effect to the distribution:

'Trlbe language of
section 2-312
effectively pierces tbe
corporate veil ... "
(1) The corporation would not be
able to pay debts of the corporation as
the debts become due in the usual
course of business; or
(2) The corporation's total assets
would be less than the sum of the
corporation's total liabilities plus,
unless the charter permits otherwise,
the amount that would be needed, if
the corporation were to be dissolved at
the time of the distribution, to satisfy
the preferential rights upon dissolu-

whose
ution
of
stockholders
preferential rights on dissolution are
superior to those receiving the
distribu tion.12
In other words, the distributions or
payments on the note for the redemption
of stock are invalid either if after, or as a
result of, making such payment, the
corporation is unable to meet its debts as
they mature, or if the corporation's total
assets fail to exceed the corporation's
liabilities plus the preferred shareholders'
equity. Once the corporation becomes
insolvent and finds itself in the bankruptcy
arena, either or both of these tests are
generally met, thereby rendering further
payments made on the stock redemption
note avoidable. Similarly, the trustee can
look back in time and determine if either
of these tests were met at the time that
each payment was made.
Section 2-312 of the Corporations and
Associations Article provides that if it is
established that a director's duties were
not performed in compliance with the
standard of care required by section 2405.1 of this article l3 "[a] director who
votes for or assents to a distribution made
in violation of the [corporate] charter or
[aforementioned] section 2-311 of this
subtitle is personally liable to the
corporation for the amount of the
distribution that exceeds what could have
been made without violating the charter or
section 2-311 of this subtitle." 14 Therefore,
in the event the trustee invalidates the
payments made on the note for
redemption of stock due to violations of
section 2-311, through his powers granted
by section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the trustee can seek to recover the assets
from both the former stockholder and all
directors who may be liable for the
unlawful distributions. It is interesting to
note that the language of section 2-312
effectively pierces the corporate veil and
holds each director personally liable.
Section 2-312(c) sets the limitations for
bringing an action against the former
shareholders and! or directors at a
maximum of three years following the
date of each unlawful distribution. 15
B. Un iform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
The second means through which the
trustee can seek to recover from the
former stockholder under Maryland law is
through the use of the Maryland Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (MUFCA).
This Act is codified in the Commercial
Law Article of the Maryland Code in
sections 15-201 through 15-214. 16
MUFCA has a statute of limitations of
three yearsY Thus, the trustee can
conceivably utilize his powers granted
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under section 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code, in conjunction with this Act, to
invalidate up to three years of payments
on the stock redemption note and to
recover from the former shareholder. The
bankruptcy trustee must bring his cause of
action based upon state statutes. While section 546{a) of the Bankruptcy Code preserves for the trustee the exclusive right to
bring suits within two years following his
or her appointment,18 the state's law statute of limitations for a state claim must
not have expired. 19 Since the statute of limitations for state claims under Maryland
law begins to run, in the absence of an
exception to the general rule, from the
accrual of the cause of action,20 the trustee's MUFCA claims on some of the earlier payments on the note may expire
during the trustee's two-year exclusive
rights period.
The heart of MUFCA, as it applies to
the stock redemption scenario presented,
is set out in sections 15-201 through 15-204
of the Commercial Law Article. Section
15-201 defines the term "conveyance" to
include, inter alia, every payment of
money, transfer, pledge of tangible or
intangible property, and the creation of
any lien or encumbrance. 21 "Every conveyance made and every obligation
incurred by a [debtor] who is or will be
rendered insolvent by it is fraudulent as to
creditors without regard to his actual
intent, if the conveyance is made or the
obligation is incurred without a fair consideration."22 Insolvency is not limited to
its definition in the usual bankruptcy
sense, but rather encompasses any situation where the present fair salable value of
the debtor's assets is less than the amount
that will be required to pay existing debts
as they become due. 2J
'Fair and Valuable' consideration, as
distinguished from adequate consideration, means that there shall be a substantial compensation for the property
conveyed or that it shall be reasonable
in view of surrounding circumstances.
What constitutes a fair consideration
under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act must be determined from
the standpoint of creditors-that is,
whether the debtor's estate has been
unfairly diminished by this conveyance-and the existence of any
intent to defraud on the part of either
the grantor or the grantee is immaterial.24
Once a corporation becomes insolvent,
the underlying value of its shares are negligible. Thus, the surrendering of such
shares by the former shareholder in
exchange for the redemption payments on
the note cannot be deemed fair consideration for the payments. As such, the trustee

may bring a cause of action based upon
MUFCA to invalidate each transaction
that occurred at a point in time when the
corporation was insolvent.

II. FEDERAL LAW
A. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
incorporates the language of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) as promulgated in 1984. Although similar in
many respects to the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act adopted in Maryland,
UFTA contains a stronger definition of
"consideration for transfer" which enables
the trustee to attack fraudulent transfers
more easily.
The pertinent language of section 548
states:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on
or within one year before the date of
the filing of the petition, if the debtor ...
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date
that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or

"Insolvency is not
limited to its
definition in the
usual bankruptcy
sense, . .. "
became insolvent as a result of
such transfer or obligation .... 25
Rather than requiring merely a fair
consideration,
UFTA
requires
a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the transfer. A leading case in this area,
In re Roco Corp.,26 addressed the problem
of reasonably equivalent value and stock
redemptions. In this case, the sole
shareholder of a corporation redeemed 100
percent of his shares for 300,000 dollars,
evidenced by a note to be paid in weekly
installments and collateralized by a
security interest in the corporation's
assets. The appellate court, in affirming the
bankruptcy court, held that the
corporation, while it was insolvent, did

not receive a reasonably equivalent value
for the transfer and "indeed received
nothing but all of its outstanding stock."
As early as 1935, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, in Robinson '1).
Wangemann,27 stated:
A transaction by which a corporation
acquires its own stock from a
stockholder for a sum of money is not
really a sale. The corporation does not
acquire anything of value equivalent to
the depletion of its assets, if the stock
is held in the treasury, as in this case.
It is simply a method of distributing a
proportion of the assets to the
stockholder.
The court went on to add:
The assets of a corporation are the
common pledge of its creditors and
stockholders are not entitled to receive
any part of them unless creditors are
paid in full. When such a transaction is
had, regardless of the good faith of all
parties, it is essential to its validity that
there be sufficient surplus to retire the
stock without prejudice to creditors, at
the time payment is made out of the
assets. In principle, the contract
between [t]he redeeming stockholder
and the corporation was executory
until the stock should be paid for in
cash.
The Robinson court expressed three
important principles: first, the logic in and
fairness to creditors in requiring a surplus
before redemption; second, the time for
measuring the date on which the transfer is
deemed to have been made is the date of
payment; and third, that when a
corporation is insolvent, its shares of stock
are valueless. These elements, when
present, set the basic parameters of the
fraudulent
conveyance.
Thus, the
surrendering of stock certificates having
little or no value in exchange for cash and
a secured note does not meet the
"reasonably equivalent value" test under
section 548.
Lack of reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer is only the first
part of a two-part test. Not all stock
redemptions fall under the guise of
fraudulent transfers. The second part is the
requirement that the debtor "was
insolvent on the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred,
or became insolvent as a result of such
or obligation .... "28 The
transfer
Bankruptcy Code defines "insolvent" as a
"financial condition such' that the sum of
such entity's debts is greater than all of
such entity's property, at a fair valuation,
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exclusive of ... (i) property transferred,
concealed, or removed with intent to
hinder, delay or defraud such entity's creditors .... "29
Section 548(dXl) declares that the time
when a transfer shall be deemed to have
been made is the point in time when the
transfer has been perfected.JO This is consonant with the earlier conclusion that
each payment on the stock redemption
note stands as a separate transaction to be
challenged by the trustee. It is relatively
unimportant that the transferor was solvent at the time the stock certificates were
surrendered and the note for the redemption price was executed, if the corporation
was insolvent at the time the transfer was
perfected and "made," pursuant to section
548(dXl).
In summary, the bankruptcy trustee can
utilize the powers granted by section 548
to invalidate transactions representing
fraudulent transfers in much the same way
as he can invalidate transactions representing fraudulent
conveyances under
Maryland law. The trustee's powers are
greater under section 548 since a lesser burden is required (i.e., the standard of reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfers). Regardless, the trustee may prefer to pursue his actions in the bankruptcy
forum, using state law becau~ of the threeyear statute of limitations, as opposed to
the statute of limitation of one year contained by section 548.

There is a presumption of insolvency
during the period beginning ninety days
prior to the filing of the petition for bankruptcy.JS While payments made to insiders
within one year of the filing may be avoided by the trustee, there is no presumption
of insolvency with respect to transfers or
payments occurring more than ninety
days prior to the filing of the petition.J6
Although the bankruptcy trustee has the
opportunity to recover from insiders for
transactions occurring over a longer
period of time, a higher burden of proof is
required.
In the stock redemption of a closely held
corporation, the redeeming shareholder
would most likely be an "insider" as a
director, officer, or person in control of
the corporation. J7 Assuming all of the elements of a preference exist, payments on
the stock redemption note made within
one year prior to the filing of the petition
are vulnerable to attack by the trustee. The

"The trustee's powers
are greater under
Section 548 ... "

B. Preferences
In addition to invalidating transactions
as fraudulent conveyances or transfers, the
bankruptcy trustee may avoid prebankruptcy transfers as preferences. Codified
primarily in section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the law allows the trustee to·
avoid transfers as preferences when all the
following elements exist: (a) any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property; (b)
to or for the benefit of a creditor; (c) for or
on account of an antecedent debt owed by
the debtor before such transfer was made;
(d) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(e) made within ninety days prior to the
filing of the petition, or, in the case of an
insider, made within one year prior to the
filing; and (f) enables such creditor to
receive more than he would have under a
Chapter 7 proceeding in the absence of the
transfer.J! By application of section 550(a),
the trustee may recover the property
transferred, or the value of such property,
from the transferee. 32
The primary purpose of the preference
provisions is to "facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
among creditors of the debtor."JJ The intent or motive of the debtor or creditor is
not material. J4

1984 amendments to section 547 of the
eliminated
the
Bankruptcy
Code
requirement that an insider must have
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the transfer.JS
Payments on the note clearly are
transfers for the benefit of a creditor on
account of an antecedent debt, and thus
satisfy the first three elements of a
preference. Insolvency is presumed for all
payments made to non-insiders. The
interpretation of the last element, as set
forth by the Supreme Court in its holding
in Palmer Clay Prods. Co. 'V. Brown,J9 is
that whether a particular transfer is
preferential should be determined not by
what the situation would have been if the
debtor's assets had been liquidated and
distributed among his creditors at the time
the alleged preferential payment was
made, but by the actual effect of the
payment as determined when bankruptcy
results."40 In essence, if an unsecured
creditor would have received anything less
than a 100 percent dividend in the
bankruptcy proceeding, any payment to
the creditor, even as a partial payment for
hiS debt, will satisfy the last element.4!

The determination as to whether a
creditor received a greater amount under
the preferential payment than he would
have received under a Chapter 7
liquidation is a necessary element. But, as
of what date should this hypothetical
liquidation analysis be determined? In the
case of In re Tenna Corp. an action was
brought to avoid a preferential transfer
two and one-half years after the original
filing of a Chapter 11 reorganization. In
deciding that the petition date was the date
for such determination, the Tenna court
held: "We believe that it is inconceivable
and illogical to assume that Congress
intended to permit the estate's trustee to
control the timing for testing whether a
payment can be avoided as a preference."42
In summary, proceeding under section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code may be a
favorable means for the bankruptcy
trustee to invalidate payments made on a
stock redemption note within one year of
the filing of the petition for bankruptcy.
Unlike invalidating the payments as
fraudulent transfers under section 548, the
trustee does not have to address the issue
of consideration. Likewise, for payments
made within ninety days of the filing of
the petition, the trustee has a presumption
of insolvency, a key element not present
under section 548.

C. Subordination
The final avenue through which the
bankruptcy trustee may avoid claims from
the redeeming shareholder for payments
on the stock redemption note is by way of
subordination. The redeeming shareholder
may pursue a claim against the estate not
only for payments coming due after the
filing of the petition for bankruptcy, but
also for any prior payments that have been
recovered from him by the bankruptcy
trustee as a preference, fraudulent transfer,
or other means. Whether this claim will be
fulfilled, in whole or in part, through the
distribution of the estate, will depend
largely upon its level of priority.
Codified in the Bankruptcy Code under
section 510(b), the pertinent language of
the law of subordination states:
For the purpose of distribution under
this title, a claim arising from recission
of a purchase or sale of security of the
debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor,
for damages arising from the purchase
or sale of such a security, or for
reimbursement
or
contribution
allowed under section 502 on account
of such a claim, shall be subordinated
to all claims or interest that are senior
to or equal the claim or interest
represented by such security, except
that if such security is common stock,
such claim has the same priority as

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19.2/ The Law Forum-II

common stock. 43
. Additionally, courts will closely scrutinize the conduct of claimants who are
insiders in order to determine whether
their transactions with the debtor justify
equitable subordination of their claims
under section 510(c).44 This result is appropriate in that shareholders have positioned
themselves as creditors, thereby prejudicing general creditors. "The exercise of
equitable subordination power is appropriate when there is a showing of fraud,
inequity, or unfairness."45
Recently the doctrine of equitable subordination was applied by the court to a
stock redemption scenario in the case of In
re Washington Plate Glass Co. The sole
shareholder of the Washington Plate Glass
Co. sold his shares to the corporation
when it was solvent. The terms of the sale
included a ten-year note secured by the
assets of the corporation. There was no
evidence that the transaction was fraudulent or entered into in anticipation of
bankruptcy. The corporation remained
solvent for several years thereafter.
Washington Plate Glass defaulted on the
note upon becoming insolvent and the
former shareholder entered a claim against
the estate for the balance of the note. The
court subordinated the claim to claims of
unsecured general creditors holding that
"the bankruptcy corporation's promise to
pay for ... [the] stock must be viewed as
conditioned upon the continued ability of
the corporation to pay without impairing
capital or creditors' interests."46 Quoting
Robinson v. Wangemann,47 the court
stated:
[t]he assets of a corporation are the
common pledge of its creditors and
stockholders are not entitled to receive
any pan of them unless creditors are
paid in full. When such a transaction
[i.e., stock redemption] is had, regardless of the good faith of the panies, it
is essential to its validity that there be
sufficient surplus to retire the stock,
without prejudice to creditors, at the
time payment is made out of
assets .... 48
In two similar cases, McConnell v. Estate
of But/er49 and In re Poole, McGonigle &
Dick, Inc.,so the court followed the same
line of reasoning. In these cases,51 the court
looked to state law to determine the validity of payments made on a stock redemption note at a time when the redeeming
corporation was insolvent.
It is unclear whether applying the Robin·
son analysis to Maryland law would yield
the same result of subordination. As discussed earlier, under the language of the
newly enacted section 2-311 of the Corporations and Associations Article of the

Maryland Code, a distribution or stock
redemption made when the corporation is
insolvent would be invalid. Subsection (d)
of section 2-311, however, allows such
claim as a general creditor by providing
that
[a] corporation's indebtedness to a
stockholder, incurred by reason of a
distribution made in accordance with
this section, is at parity with the corporation's indebtedness to the corporation's general, unsecured creditors,
except to the extent subordinated by
agreement. 52

'Trlbe court looked
to state la~ to
determine tbe
validity of payments
made on a stock
redemption note . .. "

1lI. CONCLUSION
A stock redemption agreement entered
into between a shareholder and a closely
held corporation may be executed in good
faith with full anticipation that the
corporation will continue as a viable,
profitable
entity.
The
redeeming
shareholder, however, may likely find
himself relatively powerless to enforce the
agreement into the future. If the
corporation's business takes a downturn
and the corporation is in bankruptcy, the
redeeming shareholder may find himself in
a position where the corporation has
defaulted on the note given for the
remainder of the redemption price, and
the trustee is seeking recovery of prior
payments that the shareholder received.
The trustee, by careful use of the avoiding
powers, may: (a) avoid future payments on
the stock redemption note; (b) recover
monies paid under the note; and (c)
possibly subordinate the redeeming
shareholders claim to the claims of all
general, unsecured creditors. As may be
now readily apparent, if the stock
redemption agreement calIs for an
installment method of payment, the
redeeming shareholder may find that he
will ultimately receive far less than that for
which he has bargained.

It should be noted, however, that the
official comment made by the section 6.40
Task Force of the Committee on
Corporate Law states:
The federal Bankruptcy Act and state
fraudulent conveyance statutes ... are
designed to enable the benefit of
creditors funds distributed to others in
some circumstances. In light of these
diverse purposes, it was not thought
necessary to make the tests of section
6.40 identical to the tests for
insolvency under these various
statutes.53
Therefore, the question of whether a
redeeming shareholder may "upgrade" his
former position as a shareholder to that of
a general creditor will be left to the courts
for ultimate resolution.
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